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We discuss a critical bottleneck of any Open Banking initiative that forces market participants
to share granular-level information from their clients. We argue in favor of realigning property
rights of personal data with individuals, such that they can monitor, administer and understand
pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensations from third-party usage. Finally, we present a novel
decentralized technology capable of overcoming the bottleneck.
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1 Background & Introduction
Open Banking (OB) initiatives around the world are either in discussion, or are at different levels of
implementation, see Ehrentraud et al. (2020). At its core, OB requires separating the production of
financial services from their distribution by relying on Application Programming Interfaces1 (APIs).
Although it’s initial goal was to increase competition in the payment and banking industry, it has
far reaching consequences on the creation of information sharing/enriching infrastructures. We
discuss a mayor bottleneck and propose a technology-driven solution that realign property rights
towards individuals.
In the UK, where this initiative is already implemented, the Competition and Market Authority
(CMA) argued that the banking industry suffered from inefficiencies. On the supply side there was
a large concentration on the four main commercial banks as they represented more than 70% of
the market, and that could translate into higher prices. On the demand side, there was evidence
of significant switching costs as banks’ customers showed lower switching rates compared to other
industries. The CMA concluded that banks’ customers had limited capacity to exert competitive
pressure on traditional banks. Engagement was one part of the problem. Banks’ customers were
not using optimally available financial services. On top, market frictions also play a role. Even for
engaged customers, the CMA argued that there were significant search and switching costs.
Breaking large banks was not the solution as the banking industry already had several niche
banks. Customer engagement was the main concern and the chosen path was to increase the
number of intermediaries. Authorities did not try to implement a market-based solution because
banks had to willingly share granular-level information about their customers’ activities. Banks
would fail to coordinate as individual financial institutions had strong incentives to free-ride and
deviate from an information sharing equilibrium. The Open Banking initiative required a new
information sharing/enriching infrastructure.
The CMA implemented measures to reduce entry barriers at the banking industry, and to
increase customers’ trust. Firstly, incumbent banks had to share data on customers’ transactions,
financial products offered to them and their respective pricing. Secondly, third-party providers had
to be authorized by the regulator, data sharing could only occur under explicit consent, common
1 According to Egner (2017) APIs have four main characteristics. First, they can be classified according to their
level of openness. Second, they are essential for value creation as developers can create ”on top´´ of the bank’s
application and help them distribute and innovate; also banks can use them as a marketing device; and finally they
can be used to create syndicated loans with other banks. Third, APIs require several layers of standardization
compliance, namely, legal, operational, functional and technical.
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standards were created to guarantee a secure sharing process, and explicit measures were put in
place in the event of security breaches.
Other jurisdictions. According to Ehrentraud et al. (2020) several jurisdictions have already
implemented, or are close to implement, OB initiatives. Two remarks withstand. First, while in
some jurisdictions banks must share customers’ data, offered financial services and prices, with
registered TPPs using APIs, in other jurisdictions regulators just provided recommendations and
different initiatives to encourage banks to share their information. Second, even for those countries
where is mandatory, the actual implementation could vary. Jurisdictions could have different
approaches about how much time TPPs should keep customers’ personal data, also they could
have different requirements to sell/share acquired information to fourth-parties.
Compliance at multiple jurisdictions is costly and might be used by incumbent financial
institutions as an entry barrier.
2 Data Sharing Infrastructure: A Production Chain Approach
According to Egner (2017), OB force traditional banks to migrate from a ”product centric´´ scheme
towards a ”customer centric´´ scheme. In the former, banks used to create a menu of financial
services and distribute them to their customers through their branches, website or mobile apps. In
a ”customer centric´´ scheme the production and distribution of financial services are not necessarily
bundled and could be provided by different institutions. Industry participants should decide which
financial services to produce, and which to offer, even if they are produced by another financial
institution.
We argue that the banking industry, after OB, could be analyzed as a production chain where
information is a key production input. For the sake of the argument, consider traditional banks
that produce financial services and distribute them to borrowers. After OB they can distribute
financial services from other banks, significantly reducing switching costs. Banks would specialize
in producing some financial services, and would assign the remaining effort in reaching particular
segments of the population. As we move downstream the chain firms will spend more efforts in
the distribution than in production. At the extreme of the spectrum we have a match-maker, an
institution that only connects borrowers and distributors of financial services and that is capable
to manipulate/comply/enrich highly granular personal data.
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In figure 1 we synthesize this idea. Assume that personal data is the only production input
and financial institutions are distributed along the unit interval. The production chain of the
banking industry starts with institutions that specialize in the production of financial services
using aggregate levels of personal data. Then, as we move to the right, financial institutions start
distributing their products coming from other institutions until we reach a point were institutions
only distribute financial services at a single population niche. Distribution is costly because to reach
multiple population niches higher granularity of personal data is needed. As we move downstream,
institutions are capable to process, and comply with, highly granular personal data.
Figure 1. Production Chain induced by Open Banking
One insight from Figure 1 is that sharing/enriching private information is an increasingly
costly endeavor. First, higher granularity generally comes along with more regulatory compliance.
Second, all personal data doesn’t arrive in the same shape and form, thus financial institutions must
be flexible and innovate on its manipulation/enrichment/analysis capabilities. Third, if financial
institutions want individuals to share confidential information, alongside with financial information,
they need to assign property rights on individuals. Following Kikuchi et al. (2018) terminology,
financial institutions face managerial costs convex in nature.
Another insight from Figure 1 is that financial institutions strategically pick their location
on the production chain. Institutions upstream supply inputs to other institutions downstream.
The trading of personal data between financial institutions is not frictionless, we must factor in
transaction fees, taxes, bargaining power, information asymmetries, bribes, etc. Again, following
Kikuchi et al. (2018), transaction cost will shape trading patterns between institutions along the
production chain.
As suggested by Coase (1937), and formally studied by Kikuchi et al. (2018); Yu and Zhang
(2019), the optimal size of the firm and the price function are uniquely determined in equilibrium.2
2 See Theorem 3.1 of Kikuchi et al. (2018) and Theorem 3.2 of Yu and Zhang (2019) in a generalized model where
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In equilibrium the marginal cost of managerial costs of a firm will equal the marginal cost of the
firm upstream adjusted by a transaction cost.
There are three equilibrium properties that hold beyond the simple framework of Figure 1, see
Yu and Zhang (2019). First, pricing is strictly increasing as we move downstream the production
chain. Second, firm size increases also as we move downstream. Third, higher transaction costs
will increase the equilibrium price function.
Figure 2. Low Transaction Cost: Number
of Firms and Price
The horizontal axis is the unit interval and
each division represents a different firm
over the interval. The increasing line is
the equilibrium price function.
Source: Adapted Python codes from Kikuchi et al.
(2018)
Figure 3. High Transaction Cost: Number
of Firms and Price
The horizontal axis is the unit interval and
each division represents a different firm
over the interval. The increasing line is
the equilibrium price function.
Source: Adapted Python codes from Kikuchi et al.
(2018)
Figures 2 and 3 show that, given a fixed level of managerial cost, higher transaction costs imply
fewer institutions at the production chain and higher level of prices.
Some evidence on managerial costs. Under this framework managerial costs and transaction
cost are fundamental. Recent data from two new participant at the global credit market, Fintech
and BigTech (Cornelli et al. (2020)), shows the impact of low managerial cost.
Figure 4 shows that BigTech growth lending has been outpacing Fintech’s. Fintechs do not
rely on (short-term) deposits, as traditional banks do, to provide (long-term) loans. They rely on
different funding sources such as securitizations, own equity capitalization, or they directly match
lenders and borrowers. Example of Fintechs are Zopa and Funding Circle in the UK, Lending Club
and SoFi in the US, Yiren in China, among others. Figure 5 shows that the largest share of FinTech
downstream firms may engage with multiple upstream firms.
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credit is in China and uses loan crowdfunding. The Americas also hold significant activity but their
funding rely on balance sheet lending. In Europe the funding is through equity crowdfunding.
BigTechs are large digital service institutions that have a sizable network of non-financial
institutions doing e-commerce, social media, search browsers, etc. They indirectly provide credit
through a financial service subsidiary, or through a partnership with another financial institution.
Examples range from Ant Group or Tencent’s WeBank in China, to Amazon in the UK, US and
other countries, to Google in India, to Mercado Libre in Latin America, to M-Pesa in Africa, or to
Go-Jek in Southeast Asia.
Figure 4. FinTech and BigTech Lending
Source: Cornelli et al. (2020). Data for AU, CN, EU,
GB, NZ and US
Figure 5. FinTech Financing by Region
and Activity in 2018
Source: Ehrentraud and Quevedo Vega (2020)
Figure 6 presents FinTech and BigTech credit in China, UK and the US.
Figure 6. FinTech and BigTech Lending by Jurisdiction (USD mn in logarithms)
Source: Dataset of Cornelli et al. (2020)
The situation in the UK and the US is different from the situation in China. Despite the
institutional differences we observe an important increase in BigTech credit relative to FinTech’s.
We posit that BigTechs are gaining market share because they have lower managerial costs than
6
FinTech. They have access to multiple information sources at the customer level, they usually are
technology driven, and competition authorities are still learning about how to regulate them. We
expect that through innovation and standarization of personal data managerial costs will constantly
decrease.
High transaction costs might also play a part in BigTech success, we don’t want to downplay
it’s role. But, unlike managerial costs, reducing transaction costs will prove to be a harder task.
3 Property Rights as the Bottleneck for OB
Property rights for personal data directly affect transaction cost. Currently, it’s true that
individuals are legal owners of the data they generate, but it’s impossible to know what pieces
of information are used after anyone agrees to share it with a third party. Moreover, individuals
must go through a very lengthy process to track down what pieces of information were anonymized
and shared/sold with a fourth-party. And even, must go through a more excruciating process to
guarantee their data is deleted from a third-party’s server if solicited. For all intents and purposes,
average individuals, without the time and expertise to track and analyze their data, just have the
right to share it and hope to receive a good service back.
Financial data under OB is tightly regulated. Regulated Third-Party Providers (TPPs) have to
satisfy strict compliance requirements, at least in the UK where OB has been implemented, but still
if a security leakage occurs and personal data is lost, in practice multiple financial institutions could
be involved in the transaction and it is difficult to assign responsibilities. To fully exploit the benefits
of OB individuals must provide financial institutions more personal data. The infrastructure of
personal data sharing/enriching should allow for multiple sources. Non-financial data should reflect
other aspects of daily lives, for example social media data, commuting patterns, health records,
among others. Also, benefits would increase further if it’s possible to track similar information
for their close relatives. The associated risks of providing TPPs with that much information are
self-evident but not unusual as BigTechs should already have access of some of that information,
or can infer it based on information from other individuals with similar observable characteristics.
Banks’ customers would feel comfortable sharing additional information if appropriate
regulation requirements are implemented. In other words, we would need to implement an
analogous regulation but in every other industry from which TPPs can obtain information. This
is not a minor task as we should ask ourselves if it’s feasible in the first place. Probably, instead
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of going down that path, we should ask for alternatives where individuals feel safe sharing massive
loads of personal information.
The theoretical background of our claim is the Coase Theorem.3 The latter serve as
a benchmark, see Medema (2020), from which we emphasize the impact of not having
well defined property rights on personal data as after individuals share it they can hardly
monitor/administer/delete it.
The immediate consequence of lack of property rights is that individuals will not share different
types of personal data to a single institution without the implementation of potentially intricate
compliance regulations. Transaction costs will definitively increase, and following the production
chain approach, the equilibrium price function of personal data will also increase, followed most
likely with a reduction of social welfare. Subsection 3.1 elaborates on this point further.
3.1 The welfare impact of the bottleneck
Could we argue that OB with adjusted property rights (OB2.0) is welfare enhancing?
First, we need a criteria for comparing government policies. Following Hendren and Sprung-
Keyser (2020), we propose considering the Marginal Value of Public Fund (MVPF) metric because
it just uses (i) the willingness to pay (WTP) of recipients, (ii) the net costs for the government, and
(ii) the long-term benefits for recipients. Formally, MV PFi > MV PFj ⇐⇒ WTPiNetCosti >
WTPj
NetCostj
Second, we need to define the policies to compare. On the one hand, we have the standard OB
and its MV PFOB1.0. On the other hand, we have OB2.0 and its MV PFOB2.0.
WTP for OB1.0 and OB2.0 should have at least three components, namely, consumption of
general goods (abstracting from financial services), consumption of financial services, and insights.
The distinction between the first two components is that an efficient OB should help individuals
smooth their consumption patterns, allowing to increase their long-term utility. Thus, the first
component is the present value of future consumption, and the second is the present value of
financial services. The last component, insights, is capturing the idea that individuals assign value
on holding personal data, from them and even from their close relatives, because probably they
can take better decisions in the future, or they assign a non-pecuniary value to it. Data is an asset
for individuals and not only a medium of exchange.
3 There are multiple ways to state it, but according to Rochet and Tirole (2006) “[it] states that if property rights are
clearly established and tradeable, and if there are no transaction costs nor asymmetric information, the outcome
of the negotiation between two (or several) parties will be Pareto efficient, even in the presence of externalities.”
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Government net costs can be divided it into three groups, namely, managerial costs,
transaction costs, tax revenues. The first group encompasses administrative costs, and costs
for storing/processing/enriching personal data. The second costs are fees between upstream
and downstream financial institutions and that involve, directly or indirectly, sharing personal
information from clients. Finally, the third group are tax revenues governments obtain from the
financial services.
Finally, we make two simplifying assumptions. Previously, we discussed the reasons why
BigTech credit is outpacing FinTech’s. Thus, for WTP we assume the only difference between
OB1.0 and OB2.0 is that Insights (the third component) is larger when property rights are clearly
given to individuals as they are willing to provide more personal data. For Net Cost, we assume
that transaction costs (the second component) is larger for OB1.0 as under the production chain
approach higher transaction cost increase the equilibrium price function.
4 Property Rights with Legal and Technological Design
For the exchange of a digital good such as personal data to occur in a meaningful way, some exclusive
rights must exist with the owner to exclude others from making arbitrary copies of the data.4 This
is the case also with personal data controlled by firms, which we term OPD (organisation-controlled
personal data). OPD access rights are granted to other organisations through API access terms
and conditions or through permitted selling of data to data brokers. We define PPD as person-
controlled personal data, the personal data where intellectual property rights and excludability of
the data (control) is with individuals.
Since digital personal data consists of bitstrings, and is created by the technology that collects
it, it is possible that rights could be retained by individuals if they legally owned a technological
artefact capable of real-time, on-demand and dynamic exchange of personal data. In addition,
since personal data is non-rivalrous and infinitely expansible, copies of the data may be accorded
with a different set of legal rights, rights that could be controlled by individuals themselves.
Finally, since signals are generated from combinations of personal data, the quality of the signals
would depend on the ease of different personal datasets to be combined, bundled and exchanged
so that the economic value of the data signals are high.
4 At the Appendix we provide a brief analysis about related literature on personal data.
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We present the design and built of the HAT (Hub-of-all-Things) technology and legal artefact.
Technology. In essence, the HAT is designed and constructed as private, standalone databases
embedded within containerised microservices for personal data that have clear boundaries of data
at rest, data in transit and data in use, see HAT (2020). Aside from just being a datastore,
containerised microservices wrapped around the database means it can be a ”micro-server´´,
capable of processing data within. By isolating each HAT micro-server from one another so that
every HAT is one containerised microservices-enabled database per person, boundaries are clear
and rights can be bestowed.
Technologically, the schema (data structure) was chosen to be flexible for outbound data, but
keeping the rigidity of inbound data. Apps that give data into the HAT retain their original
table and data structures within their namespaces e.g. Facebook namespace in the HAT has
a Facebook table of data, same with their original names, similar to Spotify, Google Calendar,
Fitbit etc. Outbound data from the HAT, however, can allow infinite combinations of data
values across datasets. Each of these data values and bundles can be named and then exchanged
through standard APIs using standard Internet protocols and encryption in real time. Within the
HAT comes the technological capability of embedding functions e.g. pre-trained machine learning
algorithms that transform data within the HAT and generate new data signals that sit within the
HAT, which can be exchanged through the standard APIs if the individual wishes to.
Legal Rights. Personal data use contracts cannot specify all states of nature or all future actions
and use of the data in advance. When there are states or actions that cannot be verified ex post
by third parties, they are therefore not possible to be contractible ex ante. This means that the
contract must include discretion and that discretion is to be exercised by whoever is allocated the
”ownership´´ rights to the personal data.
The literature on incomplete contracts (see Hart and Moore (1990); Aghion and Bolton (1992);
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)) has typically focused on the question of which party in a contract
should have the right to undertake certain actions in the management of those assets. If contracts
were complete, it would make no difference who was allocated that right. However, incompleteness
of personal data contracts matter in terms of who has the power to take action, and the presumption
is always that the economic actors will do so according to their interests. Deciding who should
have the power to take certain actions is therefore a matter of foreseeing which actors will be most
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likely to act in the desired way.
In the case of personal data, it is clear that future usage of one’s personal data must rest in
the control of individuals, because this would reduce the incentive for the firm to sell on the data,
especially when such an action may be obscured from the individual. Legal ownership of rights
to the micro-server can be bestowed due to the presence of clear boundaries resulting from HAT
containerisation, see HAT (2020).
Owners of such an artefact can therefore be afforded all of the intellectual property rights of
the micro-server, reducing ambiguity of personal data use. Containerising one individual’s data
within his own database wrapped with microservices allows individuals themselves to be a ‘data
controller’ and ‘data processor’.
Finally, the HAT core technology is uploaded to GitHub5 under an open-sourced AGPL license
(not be closed even if built upon), ensuring that any code within the HAT, which reveals how data
is being handled within the HAT, is transparent to all.6 Given that data within the boundaries of
the firm cannot be meaningfully “propertised” by individuals, a non-rivalrous copy of the same data
within a HAT micro-server with the same intellectual property rights on the copy for individuals
as the rights of the source for the firm, can be an equitable arrangement.
5 Final Remarks
Open Banking initiatives unbundle the production of financial services from their distribution,
and have the objective of enabling end-users to exert competitive pressure on financial
institutions. Its success depends on the efficacy of an infrastructure of personal data
sharing/manipulation/enriching based on APIs and analytics capabilities. The main bottleneck
of this infrastructure is the property rights of personal data, and we argue it requires individuals
fully owning the rights for the data they produce as it’s the only way for them to share sensible
non-financial data.
5 Visit https://github.com/dataswift.
6 In terms of usage of data within with HAT, it is clearly necessary for the data to be unencumbered so that full
excludability rights are retained by the individual through the HAT and not by the source of the data. In this
manner, micro-server access to data from the current sources such as Google or Facebook could be considered as
subject access, whether directly or through a third party, which, under European law, suggests that the ensuing
data retrieved by individuals are owned by them. While this is legally not proven in case law, a case can be made




Related Literature. Research on personal data-sharing in the economics of privacy (e.g.
Acquisti et al. (2016)) have found that disclosing personal data do bring benefits to individuals,
such as immediate monetary compensation (e.g. discounts), intangible benefits (personalisation and
customisation of information content) and price reduction as an effect of more targeted advertising
and marketing, information-based price discrimination, and more targeted ads to better inform
consumers (cf. Yang (2020); Garratt and Lee (2020); Akcura and Srinivasan (2005)). However,
such sharing also brings about costs and negative externalities for example, privacy costs, and
subjective and objective privacy harms. Conversely, it has also been suggested that sweeping
privacy regulation that result in firms not being able to obtain personal data will lead to opportunity
cost and inefficiencies (Acquisti (2010); August and Tunca (2006); Van Zandt (2004); Anderson and
de Palma (2005); Hann et al. (2006)).
With the increasing economic value of personal data, scholars have been polarised into two main
camps. The first, regulatory camp advocates for privacy protection as an end in itself, regardless of
economic consequences. The underlying notion of such an advocacy is that privacy is a human right
to personal data protection. This is consistent with the EU Charter that data being processed for
specified purposes and with consent of the person concerned or with some other legitimate basis is
laid down by law (Godel et al. (2012) p.42; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
OJ C 364, p. 10, 18.12.2000, Article 8). Enforcement of regulation would also pose a challenge
since there is doubt as to how much regulatory powers governments actually have over the Internet.
Any attempt of territorial governments to enforce privacy regulations could increase the likelihood
of data-driven companies (whose profits depend significantly on data) to employ legal arbitrage,
moving to jurisdictions outside the regulation. In the extreme, adverse selection could drive out
firms benefiting from the data economic chain, reducing tax revenues for the country.
With the continuing advancement of digital technology, the argument for personal data
protection has evolved from the human rights concern to an economic rationalisation based on the
trade-offs between risks and return (De Corniere and Taylor (2020); Godel et al. (2012)). This is
the approach taken by the self-regulatory camp, proposing that a market solution exists as a trade-
off between privacy and the benefit from data usage (Acquisti et al. (2016); Acquisti (2010)). This
camp proposes that individuals could be assigned property rights to the information so that they
are able to contract with third parties on how they might use it. Legal scholars have advocated the
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‘propertization’ of personal data and argued against the imposition of legal limits on data trade i.e.
that there is no need for “inalienabilities” (i.e. any restriction[s] on the transferability, ownership
or use of an entitlement (Rose-Ackerman (1985)). The self-regulatory framework advocates the
exchange of data and data protection to increase aggregate welfare, emphasising market self-
correction for efficiency outcomes and the regulators’ role as one of steering the market through a
combination of incentives, disclosure policies and even liability (Acquisti (2010)).
Unfortunately, the practical implementation of a self-regulatory framework faces huge challenges
because many of the data exchange contracts are incomplete and there is very little transparency
about the secondary uses for the data (Beresford et al. (2010); Godel et al. (2012)). Property
rights are a challenge for individuals to exercise when the personal data is held by firms collecting
the data and not by individuals themselves (Shapiro and Varian (1997); Laudon (1996)). Since
personal data is often mixed with other data belonging to the firm, the lack of boundaries would
make property rights for individuals too much of a challenge to implement and enforce, leading to
higher transaction costs. In addition, third parties buying and selling personal data could impose
social costs on individuals since individuals are not directly involved in these transactions, resulting
in the externalities that are not internalised by the firm (Godel et al. (2012); Odlyzko (2003); Swire
and Litan (1998); Acquisti (2010)).
Aside from the challenge in implementation, others have also argued against the trade or
propertization of personal data due to its impact on privacy. With the development of technology
and devices that can generate finely-grained information about consumers’ privacy preferences
(McGeveran (2001)), trade of personal data could lead to its commodification and contribute to
additional privacy intrusions (Tuan (2000)). Additionally, there could also be a risk of market
failure. Recognising property rights in personal data could not only encourage more trade in
personal data and thus result in less privacy (Cohen (2012)), it could lead to underinvestment in
technology and services that enable the expression of privacy preferences. This would then result
in greater information asymmetries between firms and individuals whose data is collected (Langer
(2003); Schwartz (2004)). Scholars have concluded that there is just no simple rule on whether
privacy of personal data raises or reduces welfare as it depends on the circumstances (Hermalin and
Katz (2006); Taylor (2004)). However, it is commonly acknowledged that a free market in personal
data will not provide an economically-efficient outcome. The degree of negative externalities within
and across markets will depend on circumstances, as will any increase or decrease in welfare (Hui
and Png (2006)).
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Personal data is widely used to create personalised offers such as products, prices, diets,
recommendations, insurance, that are tailored to the characteristics of particular persons. There
is much literature on whether personalisation improves exchanges and market efficiency, drawing
from work on asymmetric information (Akerlof (1970); Stiglitz (1975) and product differentiation
(Mussa and Rosen (1978); Katz (1984); Moorthy (1984). It is no surprise therefore that new ways
to gather more personal information would proliferate and their resulting data would find a market.
Current regulation now implicitly acknowledge that personal data is a commodity, tradable and
subject to the laws of supply and demand (Godel et al. (2012)).
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